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Abdallah Frangi is still quite happy. In the summer of 2007, this senior Fatah executive was forced to abandon his home after the Al Qassam Brigades, the armed wing of the radical Islamic party Hamas, took charge of the Gaza Strip in a bloody coup. A return to his house in this destitute part of Palestine would have meant to risk becoming yet one more victim of the cruel power struggle between Hamas and its arch-rival Fatah. Yet one month ago, on May 13th, Frangi finally was able to return home after authorities in post-revolutionary Egypt announced a Middle East peace agreement that had seemed unattainable: The two most powerful Palestinian factions had agreed to bury their hatchet, form a government of unaffiliated technocrats and prepare for statehood and elections in the coming months. “People in Gaza are very optimistic. It is so good to be back”, Frangi told The Star just a few days ago in an interview conducted over the phone. But only two days later, a full six weeks after the deal was signed, the entente looked far less cordial than the press conference announcing it. Hamas and Fatah seem unable to find enough common ground. Rhetoric that had briefly turned conciliatory is rapidly reverting back to the hateful patterns of yore.
Within days after signing the agreement it became clear that neither side had internalized compromises need to be made to accommodate both rivals in a single government. “In many ways, the reconciliation agreement is very shallow”, opines the Palestinian commentator Sam Bahour in Ramallah. Hamas insisted it would never give up any arms in its possession, that the new government had no authority to enter into peace negotiations should they unexpectedly materialize, and that it would be an equal or even senior partner in the government. The Islamists reiterated their known refusal to abide by the international community’s demands to turn its back on armed struggle, recognize signed agreements and Israel’s right to exist.
In part to stave off diplomatic pressure from the European Union and the U.S., Fatah chairman Mahmoud Abbas immediately staked similar claims: As President of the Palestinian Authority (PA) only he would charter the course of the new government, which would be bound by his directives. Abbas fears potentially disastrous consequences for his foreign-aid dependent PA should a recalcitrant Hamas take over the government and donor nations decide to let the flow of money run dry.
While the ideological struggle between Hamas and Fatah goes back more than 20 years, it now focuses on the dispute over the identity of the future Prime Minister. Abbas wants to keep Salim Fayyad on board, the current PM instated after Hamas’ violent takeover in 2007. Fayyad has a proven track record: Highly respected by donor nations and supported by 45% of Palestinians according to recent polls, this former banker has concentrated on successful nation building projects that have earned him international praise. His resolve to keep the Palestinian struggle unarmed, and the subsequent crackdown on Hamas activists in the West Bank, has even the Israeli army admit grudgingly that the PA is doing a good job in fighting terror – which is exactly why the Islamists reject Abbas’ bid to keep Fayyad in power.
Hamas official Salah Bardawil told The Associated Press on Sunday that his movement “will not agree to grant Salam Fayyad the confidence to run the national unity government.” Abbas’ statement that only Fayyad could do the job and that he alone would determine the government’s future course of action was slammed by Hamas as an “unjustified media escalation”. Its spokesman Sami Abu Zuhri called the PA president's statements “false and harmful to efforts to Palestinian unity efforts”. Hamas’ website argued that any new government must be approved by the Palestinian Legislative Council, the PA’s Parliament elected in 2006, where it commands an absolute majority.
These differences appear unbridgeable. A summit between Abbas and Hamas leader Khaled Mashal planned for this week to announce the composition of the new, common government has been postponed indefinitely. Some spokespeople maintain Mashal and Abbas will appear together in the near future to announce the formation of a new cabinet: “I am still optimistic”, says Frangi, who is Abbas’ senior advisor on foreign policy. But behind the scenes, the apprehension that Hamas and Fatah will simply never be able to agree is rising. Already, Hamas is raising new accusations that Fatah’s security forces continue to arrest scores of its activists in the West Bank, after both sides had announced they would release political prisoners. According to the analyst Bahour, these tensions arise not only from irreconcilable differences, but also stem from much “foreign meddling”: “The U.S. is exerting huge amounts of pressure on Abbas not to sit with Hamas. Washington puts him in an impossible position”, says Bahour.
Without any prospect of meaningful negotiations with Israel on the horizon, and without the specter of uniting Palestinians under one government, Abbas options are very limited. He had planned to turn to the UN general assembly in September in a bid for become a member state within the 1967 borders, bypassing a veto by the U.S. and bypassing negotiations with Israel. But without a unified populace behind him, Abbas can hardly claim to represent his people, something that will weaken his uncertain strategy to reach statehood. What the Palestinians will be left with then would be an unbearable stalemate, or the even less appealing specter of turning back to Hamas’ ideology of armed struggle. © 2011 Gil Yaron - Making the Middle East Understandable
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